Discriminatory Membership Policies in Federally Chartered Nonprofit Corporations by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 72 Issue 6 
1974 
Discriminatory Membership Policies in Federally Chartered 
Nonprofit Corporations 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Nonprofit Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, Discriminatory Membership Policies in Federally Chartered Nonprofit Corporations, 
72 MICH. L. REV. 1265 (1974). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol72/iss6/4 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
May 1974] Notes 
Discriminatory Membership Policies in Federally 
Chartered Nonprofit Corporations 
J. lNTRODUCTWN 
1265 
Since 1791 the United States has created federal corporations by 
specific acts of Congress.1 These corporations fall into three general 
types,2 including corporations organized in the District of Colum-
bia, 8 corporations that carry out a federal governmental or public 
function,4 and private nonprofit corporations that undertake educa-
tional, charitable, historical, cultural or similar purposes. About fifty 
groups comprise the third category, including the American National 
Red Cross, 5 the Girl Scouts of America, 6 the Boy Scouts of America,7 
the United States Olympic Committee, 8 the American Legion,ll the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (VFW),1° and the 
Little League.11 
I. The first charter was to establish the Bank of the United States. Act of Feb. 25, 
1791, ch. 10, § 3, l Stat. 192. 
2. See R. POLING, CORPORATIONS CHARTER£0 BY Ac:r OF CONGRESS 2 (Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress ed. 1973). 
3. Corporations organized in the District of Columbia include the whole gamut 
of organizations typically chartered by a state, such as gas and water companies (e.g., 
Georgetown Gaslight Co., created by Act of Jnly 20, 1854; ch. 98, §§ 1-12, 10 Stat. 
786), cemeteries (e.g., Prospect Hill Cemetery, created by Act of June 13, 1860, ch. 122, 
§§ 1-12, 12 Stat. 32), educational institutions (e.g., Howard University, created by Act 
of March 2, 1867, ch. 162, §§ 1-10, 14 Stat. 438), hotels (e.g., Capitol Hotel Co., 
created by Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 123, §§ 1-5, 13 Stat. 539), and insurance companies 
(e.g., Mutual Investment Fire Insurance Co. of the District of Columbia, created by 
Act of Jan. 28, 1905, ch. 285, §§ 1-16, 33 Stat. 622). Congress acts as a local legislature 
when incorporating business organizatio1,ci, now following the standard state pro-
cedure of allowing incorporation by the filing of appropriate papers. See D.C. CoDE 
ANN., § 29-201 (1973). 
4. This category includes, for instance, banks (e.g., Bank of the -United States, 
created by Act of April 10, 1816, ch. 44, § 7, 3 Stat. 269), railroads (e.g., National 
Railroad Passenger Corp., created by the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. 
L. No. 91-519, §§ 301-08, 84 Stat. 1327), the Federal Deposit Insurance Co. (created 
by the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 12B, 48 Stat. 168), and the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (created by the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, cl>. 32, §§ 1-30, 48 
Stat, 58). There is no statutory procedure for incorporating ori"lnizations in this 
category. Charters are granted on a case-by-case basis. 
5. 36 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1970) (incorporated 1905). 
6. 36 U.S.C. §§ 31-39 (1970) (incorporated 1950). 
7. 36 U.S.C. §§ 21-29 (1970) (incorporated 1916). 
8. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-83 (1970) (incorporated J950). 
9. 36 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1970) (incorporated 1919). 
10, 36 U.S.C. §§ lll-20 (1970) (incorporated 1936). 
11. Act of July _16, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-378, §§ 1-18, 78 Stat. 325. Additional ~-
amples include the Agricultural Hall of Fame (charter codified at 36 U.S.C. §§ 971-88 
(1970)), the Future Farmers of America (charter codified at 36 U.S.C. §§ 271-91 (1970)), 
and the American Veterans of World War II (charter codified at 36 U.S.C. §§ 67-67s 
(1970)). - -
Unlike states, which typically provide a simple statutory procedure for incorporation 
of nonprofit groups, the Federal government creates national nonprofit corporations 
only· by specific acts of Congress. A bill is introduced in one of the houses and is 
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Recently, the discriminatory membership policies of some of 
these nonprofit organizations have aroused interest. The Boy Scouts, 
for example, maintain that "no boy can grow into the best kind of 
citizen without recognizing his obligation to God,"12 and therefore 
refused to initiate a ten-year-old boy as a member of a Cub Scout 
pack because he had stricken the word "God" from the Scout Promise 
on his application.13 The Little League and the VFW have also in-
vited attention; recent suits have been brought against both organi-
zations challenging their practice of limiting membership to men.14 
then assigned to a committee. In the Senate, the bill usually goes to the Judiciary 
Committee's subcommittee on Federal Charters, Holidays, and Celebrations. In the 
House, it goes to either the Judiciary Committee or the Committee on the District of 
Columbia. Once passed by both houses and signed by the president, the charter is a 
public law and is usually encoded in Title 36 of the United States Code-Patriotic 
Societies and Observances. The charter typically contains the name of the corporation 
and the incorporators, the purposes of the organization, a designation of a principal 
office and a requirement of an agent to receive service of process, conditions for 
membership, and an enumeration of the corpc,:ate powers, typically including tl1e 
power to sue and be sued, to contract and be contracted with, to acquire, hold and 
convey property, to make bylaws, to h;,.ve a seal, and to appoint officers, 
Although the issue has never been raised, there exists a theoretical problem of 
finding constitutional authority for congressional incorporation of certain nonprofit 
organizations. Because incorporation is not authorized by an c.-.:press constitutional 
provision, its validity depends upon whether it is "necessary and proper" to the cXer• 
cise of a delegated power. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In-
corporation of a veterans' organization may be justified as deriving from Congress's 
power to regulate military affairs, but the delegated power supporting incorporation 
of groups such as the Little League and the Girl Scouts is unclear. Altllough Congress 
has the power "To ••• provide for the ••• general Welfare of the United States," 
U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, this clause is read as only a qualification of tlle taxing 
power. See, e.g., U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). The commerce clause may provide 
autllority in certain cases, but it is diffirult to see how a group such as the Little 
League "affect[s] commerce." Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971). 
Uncertainty concerning legislative authority also characterizes private bills, to 
which federal charters bear considerable resemblance. In addition, both lack the 
generality normally expected of legislation, both lack statutory definition and pro-
cedure, and botll present intractable equal protection problems. See Note, Private 
Bills in Congress, 79 HARV, L. REv, 1684, 1686 (1966): 
[U]nanswered problems related to the notion of "equal protection" are raised 
when an individual denied a bill is in all relevant respects in tlle same position 
as one for whom a bill has been passed •••• Because there is no appeal from 
amgressional rejection, and because Congress sheds so little light on its enactment 
of private legislation, it is impossible to determine whetller tllere is truly like 
treatment in like cases. 
These probiems, however, are beyond tlle scope of this Note. 
12. Statement of Executive Board, Pine Tree Council, Boy Scouts of America, Port-
land, Maine, in N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1973, at 60, col. 4 (late city ed.). 
13. ld, 
14. The suits against the Little League have been brought on a number of tlleorJcs. 
In King v. Little League Baseball, Inc., Civil Action No. 40304 (E.D. Mich. July 6, 
1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-1940, 6tll Cir., Sept. 14, 1973, tlle plaintiff brought 
, an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970), alleging tllat her rights to equal pro-
tection under the fiftll and fourteenth amendments had been infringed, Her claim 
of "governmental action" was based on the Little League's extensive use of public 
facilities and the existence of a federal charter. The plaintiff also sought a 
declaration that tlle charter did not prohibit girls from competing. See Complaint at 
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While it is not clear that any federally chartered groups presently 
practice racial discrimination, several organizations have done so in 
the past.15 
These controversial practices raise the question of whether judi-
cial remedies exist for persons discriminatorily denied membership 
in federally chartered organizations. Traditional judicial response 
has been a reluctance to interfere with the policies of private associ-
ations, particularly where membership benefits are primarily social 
rather than economic. Therefore, if constraints on membership 
policies of federally chartered groups are to be found, they must flow 
from the charter itself. This Note will propose two theories by which 
such constraints may be derived, both of which rely heavily on the 
unique nature of a federal charter as an expression of official ac~laim 
for an exemplary group. The first theory requires that the incorporat-
ing statute be read in light of federal public policy and construed not 
to require, and in fact to prohibit, discrimination inconsistent with 
federal policy. The second approach invokes the constitutional doc-
trine of governmental action. There is clearly sufficient governmental 
involvement to impose constitutional prohibitions if the statute char-
tering the group mandates the challenged membership policy. Even 
2, King v. Little League Baseball, Inc., Civil Action No. 40304 (E.D. Mich. July 6, 
1973). The court dismissed the suit for lack. of jurisdiction, finding insufficient evi-
dence of governmental action. It- did not address the question of charter interpretation. 
Another case treating these issues similarly is Wachs v. Newton Little League, No. 72-
1300 (E.D. Mass. May 17, 1972) (unreported case). A different theory proved successful 
in National Organization of Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., Dock.et No. A-
1313-73 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. March 29, 1974), appeal docketed, No. 10588, N.J. 
Sup. Ct. May 7, 1974), where the plaintiffs based their challenge on a violation of a state 
statute prohibiting se.'s discrimination by operators of "public accommodations." The 
court upheld a determination by the State Division on Civil Rights finding the Little 
League to be a public accommodation, and did not agree with the defendant's posi-
tion that the Little League's federal charter prohibited female participation and 
hence preempted regulation by state law. The Little League cases may now be mooted 
because of the recent decision of the League's board of directors to allow girls to par-
ticipate, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1974, at 25, col. 3-8 (late city ed.). However, cases in-
volving issues such as the propriety of the Little League's expulsion of a boy for hair 
length may still arise. See Wirkus v. Union Little League, Inc., Dock.et No. C-4158-72 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. March 19, 1974) (default judgment against Little League). 
Sex discrimination by the VFW was challenged on statutory and constitutional 
grountls in Stearns v. VFW, 353 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1973), revd., No. 73-1197 
(D.C. Cir. June 19, 1974). See note 97 and text accompanying notes 110-17 infra for 
discussion of the case. 
15. See, e.g., Chapman v. American Legion, 244 Ala. 553, 14 S.2d 225 (1943); Hear-
ings on Corporation Charter Bills Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judidary, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 34-36 (1946), referring to racially discriminatory policies 
of the American Legion and the VFW. Also, the American National Red Cross segre-
gated its blood bank until 1950. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1950, at 7, col. 1 (late city ed.). 
The abandonment of the practice was probably influenced by public criticism. See, 
e.g., Editorial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1950, at 24, col. 3 (late city" ed.); Id., April 2, 
1943, at 15, col. 3 (late city ed.) (reporting criticism by the Quakers); Id., March 25, 
1943, at 20, col. 3 (late city ed.) (reporting criticism by the Interracial Committee of 
the Women's Division of the Greater New York Federation of (?hurches). 
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if the charter does not require the discrimination, the grant of a 
federal charter alone may be sufficient to characterize the group's 
practices as governmental action and therefore subject to constitu-
tional constraints. 
II. TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL RESPONSE 
Courts generally have been reluctant to interfere with the mem-
bership policies of private nonprofit associations.16 However, they are 
more willing to intervene when expulsion of a member is challenged 
than when exclusion of an applicant is involved. Membership status 
in expulsion cases has been protected under a variety of legal theories, 
including property,17 contract,18 and tort.19 Whatever the nature of 
the right, three tests are applied to judge the propriety of the expul-
sion: "(1) [T]he rules and proceedings [of the association] must not 
be contrary to natural justice; (2) the expulsion must nave been in 
accordance with the rules; (3) the proceedings must have been free 
from malice (bad faith)."20 The "natural justice" principle, which 
Chafee terms an "unwritten 'due process' clause,"21 is used to ex-
amine the procedural and substantive adequacy of the association's 
rules. Thus, the expulsion process must afford at least notice22 and an 
opportunity to defend.23 Furthermore, a member must not be expelled 
for violating a rule that is contrary to law or public policy; that is, the 
rule may neither itself violate the law or require a member to do so, 
nor "[prohibit] or [inhibit] the performance by the individual of a 
duty or function for the performance of which the state normally 
16. Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L, REv, 
993, 996 (1930), Chafee uses the word "associations" to include nonprofit groups 
generally, whether incorporated or not. A similar practice will be followed here. 
17. Fussell v. Hail, 233 Ill. 73, 84 N.E. 42 (1908); Heaton v. Hall, 51 App. Div, 
126, 64 N.Y.S. 279 (1900). 
18. Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal. 613, 50 Pac. 763 (1897); Krause v. Sander, 66 Misc. 
601, 122 N.Y.S. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1910). 
19. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904); Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App, Div, 
487, 194 N.Y.S. 401 (1922). 
20. Chafee, supra note 16, at 1014. 
21, Id, at 1015. 
22. See, e.g., Nametra, Inc. v. American Soc. of Travel Agents, Inc., 28 Misc. 2d 
291, 211 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Harmon v. Mathews, 27 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct, 
1941); In re Gallaher v. American Legion, 154 Misc. 281, 277 N.Y.S. 81 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 
mem., 242 App. Div. 604, 271 N.Y.S. 1012 (1934); Slanina v. Greek Catholic Union of 
Russian Bhds. of U.S.A., 153 Pa. Super. 298, 33 A.2d 807 (1943). See also Chafee, 
supra' note 16, at 1016; Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of 
Private Associations, 76 HARv. L. REv. 983, 1028-29 (1963) [hereinafter Private Associa-
tions]. 
, 23. An opportunity to defend generally means a hearing, but the requirement 
varies according to the nature of the association, the issues involved, and the poten-
·tial harm to"the individual. See, e.g., Nametra, Inc. v. American Soc. of Travel Agents, 
Inc., 28 Misc. 2d 291, 211 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Harmon v. Mathews, 27 
N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct. 1941). See also Private Assodations, supra note 22, at 1029. 
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relies on individual initiative."24 The former requirement means 
that an organization, for example, cannot require that a member dis-
obey a court order25 or buy illegally adulterated coffee.26 The latter 
requirement ensures that "[t]he role of the member as a responsible 
citizen-voter, witness, petitioner to the legislature-is protected."27 
The early New York case of In re Gallaher v. American Legion28 
illustrates the above principles in the federal charter context. An 
American Legion post and its members sought a writ of mandamus 
to compel restoration of its charter, which had been revoked for a 
violation of a Legion regulation prohibiting a post from publicly 
opposing any position taken by the national organization. The court 
granted the writ, holding that there were both procedural and sub-
stantive defects in the expulsion. First, the court found the failure 
to apprise post officers of the charges against them to be contrary to 
"settled principles of law."29 Whether or not the Legion's rules or 
bylaws so provided, "notice of the charges and a reasonable oppor-
tunity to be heard is always required .... "3° Fur~ermore, the ex-
pelled post had not been granted the right of appeal afford~d under 
the Legion's bylaws. Substantively, the court held that the regulation 
unreasonably inhibited the "fundamental right" to "publish [one's] 
sentiments on all subjects,"31 and therefore was "opposed to the spirit 
if not the very letter of our State Constitution and our Federal Con-
stitution."32 Concluding that the' regulaton was "contrary to law, 
unsound in principle, and out of harmony with the noble ideals for 
which this fine organization was founded,"83 the court expressly re-
lied on the doctrine that "[b ]y-laws and regulations of associations 
must be reasonable and not contrary to law or to public policy."34 
By forbidding the Legion to expel members for publicly opposing 
the payment of a soldiers' bonus, the holding may illustrate the tra-
ditional protection of a citizen's right to advocate a position on legis-
lation, in accordance with Chafee's "unwritten 'due process' clause"85 
for expulsion cases. However, the case may be read more broadly. 
24. Private Associations, supra note 22, at 1029. 
25. Nissen v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N.W. 858 (1941). 
26. In re Lurman, 90 Hun 303, 35 N.Y.S. 956 (Sup. Ct. 1895), affd., 149 N.Y. 588, 
44 N,E. 1125 (1896). 
27. Private Associations, supra note 22, at 1029. 
28. 154 Misc. 281, 277 N.Y.S. 81 (Sup. Ct.), affd. mem., 242 App. Div. 604, 27_1 N.Y.S. 
1012 (1934). 
29. 154 Misc. at 283, 277 N.Y.S. at 83. 
30. 154 Misc. at 283, 277 N.Y.S. at 83. 
31. 154 Misc. at 285, 277 N.Y.S. at 85. 
32. 154 Misc. at 284, 277 N.Y.S. at 85. 
33. 154 Misc. at 285, 277 N.Y.S. at 85. 
3-f. 154 Misc. at 285; 277 N.Y.S. at 85. 
35. See text accompanying note 21 supra. 
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The facts do not clearly involve the right to petition the government 
in support of legislation. Moreover, the court's reference to the first 
amendment and its statement that the expulsion "transcend[ ed] the 
powers granted to the Legion by the act of Congress incorporating 
it"36 suggest that the case was decided not upon traditionally nar-
row public policy grounds, but by the use of federal public policy, 
in part defined by the federal constitution, as an indicator of con-
gressional intent in granting a federal charter. This theory of ad-
judication will be fully explored below.37 
Courts have been more reluctant to interfere with the exclusion 
of applicants from membership,38 particularly in cases involving so-
cial groups. In Trautwein v. Harbourt39 plaintiffs sought damages 
for malicious exclusion from the Order of the Eastern Star, a fra-
ternal organization. The New Jersey court, distinguishing expulsion 
cases, cases in which membership is an economic necessity, and cases 
in which the organizations are "repositories of civic, civil or political 
rights,"40 concluded that 
there is no "abstract right to be admitted" to membership in a volun• 
tary association ...• The general rule is that there is no legal remedy 
for exclusion .•. no matter how arbitrary or unjust ...• 
• . • Moluntary associations generally have the ·unquestionable 
right to exclude from membership on any basis whatever.41 
Courts have been more willing to intervene where the organiza-
tion is one in which denial of membership has important adverse 
economic ·effects. Though they have occasionally relied on a state 
action theory, 42 the more common ground is a concern for the as-
sociation's exercise of "quasi-governmental power."43 In Falcone v. 
Middlesex County Medical Society,44 for example, the New Jersey 
supreme court found that the defendant had a monopoly of power 
36. 154 Misc. at 284, 277 N.Y.S. at 85. 
37. See Part Ill infra. 
38. See, e.g., Chapman v. American Legion, 244 Ala. 553, 556-57, 14 S.2d 225, 227•28 
(1943); Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Assn., 47 N.J. Eq, 519, 524, 20 A. 492, 494 
(Ch. 1890). 
39. 40 N.J. Super. 247, 123 A.2d 30 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 22 N.J. 220, 
125 A.2d 233 (1956). 
40. 40 N.J. Super. at 264-65, 123 °A.2d at 39, 
41. 40 N.J. Super. at 260, 267, 123 A.2d at 37, 41, quoting Mayer v. Journeymen 
Stonecutters' Assn., 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 524, 20 A. 492, 494 (Ch. 1890). 
42. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 
(1944); Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc., 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966). See also 
Private Associations, supra note 22, at 1040. 
43. Other theories argued occasionally, but less successfully, are antitrust violation 
(state and federal) and tortious economic injury. See Note, Judicially Compelled 11.d• 
mission to Medical Societies: The Falcone Case, 75 HARV, L. R.Ev. 1186 (1962). 
44. 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961). 
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over local hospital facilities, and stated that "[p ]ublic policy strongly 
dictates that this power should not be unbridled but should be 
viewed judicially as a fiduciary power to be exercised in reasonable 
and lawful manner for the advancement of the interests of the medi-
cal profession and the public generally."45 Since Falcone, courts have 
begun to insist that, in cases where membership in an association is 
a practi,cal necessity (cases involving professional societies and unions, 
for example), an applicant is entitled to a hearing embodying the 
elements of due process and can be rejected only for good cause.46 
Though Falcone illustrates a judicial willingness to confront ar-
bitrary exclusion from membership, its applicability in federal char-
ter cases is questionable. Most federally chartered groups do not 
wield the economic power over an individual necessary for judicial 
intervention. Furthermore, although In re Gallaher indicates that 
courts will protect an established membership right that is threat-
ened by expulsion, such protection may be of little practical signifi-
cance because al}Y groups determined to bar certain persons can 
discriminate ab initio, thus avoiding the need for expulsion. Tradi-
tional judicial .response, then, is inadequate to deal with most dis-
criminatory membership policies of federally chartered groups. If 
one is to find constraints on such policies, one must look to the fed-
eral charter itself, finding constraints either as a matter of statutory -
interpretation or as a result of the constitutional theory of govern-
mental action. 
Ill. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
The doctrine that voluntary associations have an absolute right 
to deny membership to applicants is applied whether or not the as-
sociation is incorporated, unless the incorporating charter "imposes 
a clear obligation on the corporation to admit certain persons to 
membership."47 Determining the circumstances in which a federal 
charter imposes such an obligation is thus of central importance. 
In Chapman v. American Legion48 the plaintiff argued that the 
Legion was obligated to admit him if he met the membership re-
45. 34 N.J. at 597, 170 A.2d at 799. 
46. See Blende v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 96 Ariz. 240, 245, 393 P.2d 926, 
930 (1964) (In assessing good cause courts should consider "the social value of the goal 
of the O Society's action; the appropriateness of the Society as a means for achieving 
the goal; and the reasonableness of this particular action of the Society in relation 
to the goal."); Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc. of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P .2d 
495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969). The doctrine that an organization's quasi-public posi-
tion imposes certain restrictions against arbitrary exclusion has also been used in 
union cases in which membership was denied on the basis of race. See Thorman v. 
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320 P.2d 494 
(1958); James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944), 
47. Chapman v. American Legion, 244 Ala. 553, 557, 14 S.2d 225, 228 (1943). 
48. 244 Ala. 553, 14 S.2d 225 (1943). 
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quirements set forth in the Legion's charter. The court rejected the 
claim, holding that, though the charter prescribed membership quali-
fications in terms of military record only, it could not be implied that 
all who met the qualifications could become members.49 To the same 
effect is Reiter v. American Legion,50 where the court held that the 
provision of the Legion charter limiting membership, in effect, to 
veterans of the first or second world wars was "manifestly merely a 
restriction upon eligibility, . . . in no wise limit[ing] the inherent 
power of the organization to adopt additional criteria of eligibility 
having a reasonable relation to its statutory purpose and not contrary 
to public policy."51 Though Chapman and Reiter dealt only with the 
American Legion charter, that charter is typical of others. The cases 
thus suggest that a federal charter, on its face, generally does not 
restrict an association's traditional power to limit membership as it 
pleases. 
However, there is good cause to look beyond the face of the char-
ter to find a duty to refrain from invidious discrimination in selecting 
members. A federal charter is a federal statute, and as such must be 
read in light of Congress's avowed acclamatory purpose in granting a 
charter and its strong declarations against discrimination in other 
contexts. Given the close scrutiny that characterizes the chartering 
process, and the supposed exemplary nature of the chartered bodies, 
an implied_ prohibition against discrimination that violates federal 
public policy, and is thus presumably contrary to the national inter-
est, may be the only interpretation of the charter that fully expresses 
congressional intent.52 
49. 244 Ala. at 556, 14 S.2d at 227-28: 
[T]hough certain service men may be eligible to membership under the Act of 
Congress creating the organization, the corporation itself .Q.as the right to deter-
mine • • • whether or not any person may be elected to membership in the 
respects indicated in its Constitution and By-laws. 
[Furthermore, even if the applicant meets the additional requirements of the 
Constitution and By-laws,] membership therein is not an absolute right, • • • 
the respective posts have the authority to refuse an application for a post or 
for membership therein. • • • 
50. 189 Misc. 1053, 72 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct.), afjd. mem., 278 App. Div. 757, 75 
· N.Y;S.2d 530 (1947), appeal denied, 273 App. Div. 877, 77 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1948), 
51. 189 Misc. at 1055, 72 N.Y.S.2d at 347. The suggestion in Reiter that member, 
ship policies are subject to a public policy limitation must be considered in light 
of the fact that Reiter was an expulsion case. That the public policy caveat wo?ld 
gi:ant a right to membership in exclusion cases is problematic. See text accom}>anymg 
notes 38-41 supra. Perhaps Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc., 34 N.J, 582, 
170 A.2d 791 (1961) offers support for such a proposition. See text accompanyi~g 
notes 44-46 supra. Even if public policy does afford a right to membership in certam 
instances, however, the right would not be as broadly applicable as the statutory 
right discussed in this section of the Note. 
52. Such a reading would not unconstitutionally infringe the freedom of association 
of members of the chartered group. Cf. Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 
(1945); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1165-68 (D.D.C.), affd, sub nom. Coit v, 
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 297 A.2d 607 (Me, 
1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 924 (1973). 
The need to interpret a charter may arise not only where a party contends that 
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The extent of congressional scrutiny is evident in the high stan-
dards a group must meet before it will receive a federal charter. 
Prior to 1969, Congress had no express requirements for incorpo-
ration. Nevertheless, the congressional debates and committee reports 
relating to the grant of charters give some indication of the selectivity 
with which charters were granted and the factors that impressed 
Congress. Particularly favored were groups with ~'patriotic, fraternal, 
historical, and educational [purposes]-all in keeping with the high-
est traditions of the American heritage,"63 "character building or-
ganization[s]"64 emphasizing "democratic methods and procedures,''55 
groups with "national stature,''56 and groups that were "nonpolitical, 
nonsectarian, ... [ and open to all] regardless of economic status, race, 
or creed."57 The ad hoc nature of federal incorporation, however, led 
to discontent and increased pressure to adopt more ·selective and 
clearly defined criteria. This dissatisfaction resulted in occasional 
mass rejections of charter requests, 58 attempts at adopting more 
the charter prohibits discrimination, but also where one of the parties claims that 
the charter mandates discrimination. For example, a plaintiff seeking membership in 
a chartered group may assen that the charter compels his -exclusion, thus providing 
the basis for a governmental action claim. See Stearns v. VFW, 353 F. Supp. 473 
(D.D.C. 1972), revd., No. 73-1197 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 1974) (for further discussions, see 
note 97 infra and accompanying text). Or the organization may argue that the char-
ter's mandate preempts a state law forbidding discrimination. See National Organiza-
tion of Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., Docket No. A-1313-73, (N.J. Super. 
CL, App. Div., March 29, 1974), appeal docketed, No. 10588, N.J. Sup. Ct., May 7, 
1974, discussed in note 14 supra. 
53. 104 CoNG. REc. 12230 (1958) (remarks of Congressman Vursell.) 
54. S. REP. No. 1321, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1950) (recommending incorporation of 
the Girl Scouts) {hereinafter GIRL SCOUT REPORT]. _ 
55. Id. at 2. 
56. S. REP. No. 1154, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964) (recommending incorporation 
of the Little League). 
57. GIRL SCOUT REPOR'l', supra note 54, at 2. 
58, For example, no charter bills were reported out of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee betlveen 1942 and 1946, apparently because of a concern that Congressional recogni-
tion not be abused. See Hearings on Corporation Charter Bills Before a Subcomm. of 'the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 5 (1946). See also 104 CONG. 
REc. 12217 (1958) (remarks' of Congressman Celler): 
The issue of corporate charters involves troublesome and difficult considerations 
which plague the Committee on the Judiciary year after year. Every member of 
that committee and most members of the House have been subjected to varying 
degrees of pressure by a multitude of groups seeking Federal corporate ·charters. 
Congress has already granted about 26 such charters to various organizations 
and yet the demand and the pressures continue. During the 84th and 85th 
Congresses alone, 33 different organizations have sought Federal charters from 
this House. Where do we draw the line? Many of these groups have meritorious 
purposes. To grant a charter to one and not to another is to invite the accusa-
tion of favoritism. To grant charters to all is to dilute the value and prestige 
· of the Federal charter to anyone • 
• • • The result is that Congress continues to create corporate bodies which 
may then go about their business very much as they please. I submit that in 
view of these facts Congress should exercise its power to grant corporate charters 
most sparingly and most prudently. 
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formal requirements,119 a law requiring annual audits of private cor• 
porations with federal charters,60 and ultimately President Johnson's 
veto of a proposed charter.61 Finally, in 1969, responding to President 
Johnson's suggestion that charters be granted only on a "selective 
basis" to groups that meet a "national interest standard,"62 subcom-
mittees of the House and Senate agreed to formal standards for 
granting federal charters.63 The standards require that the group be 
nonpartisan, nonprofit, and operated "solely for charitable, literary, 
59. See SENATE Cm,IM. ON nm JUDICIARY, ESTABLISHING AND EFFECTUATING A POLICY 
WITH REsPECT TO THE CREATION OR CHARTERING OF CERTAIN CORPORATIONS DY ACT OF 
CONGRESS, S. REP. No. 30, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). 
60. Act of Aug. 30, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-504, §§ 1-3, 78 Stat. 635 (codified at 36 
u.s.c. §§ 1101-03 (1970)). 
61. MEssAGE FROM nm PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 292, 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (vetoing a bill to incorporate the Youth Council on Civic 
Affairs). President Johnson stated: 
For some tinle I have been concerned with the question of whether we were 
granting Federal charters to private organizations on a case-by-case basis without 
the benefit of clearly established standards and criteria as to eligibility. Worthy 
civic, patriotic, and philanthropic organizations can and do incorporate their 
activities under State law. It seems obvious that Federal charters should be 
granted, if at all, only on a selective basis and that they should meet some 
national interest standard. 
Other questions indicate the desirability of further study of this matter. 
For example, does the granting of Federal charters to a limited number of or• 
ganizations discriminate against similar and worthy organizations and possibly 
stifle their growth? Should federally chartered corporations be more carefully 
supervised by an agency of the Federal Government? Does Federal rather than 
State chartenng result in differences in the legal or tax status of the corporation, 
and are any differences appropriate ones? 
Id. at 1-2. 
62. See note 61 supra. 
63, HOUSE COM?>I, ON TilE JUDICIARY, 91ST COJ.IIG,, 1ST SESS,, STANDARDS FOR THE 
GRANTING OF FEDERAL CHARTERS (Comm. Print 1969): 
STANDARDS FOR THE GRANTING OF FEDERAL CHARTERS 
(Agreed to jointly by Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on the Judiciary 
of the House of ~epresentatives, and the Subcommittee on Federal Charters, 
Holidays, and Celebrations of the Committee of the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate). 
In considering proposals for the granting of Federal charters, the following mim-
mum standards will be applied: 
Any private organization petitioning Congress for the purpose of obtaining 
the status of a Federal corporation shall be required to demonstrate to the 
satisfaction of the Congress that it is an organization which is-
(1) operating under a charter granted by a State or the District of Columbia 
and that it has so operated for a sufficient length of time to demonstrate 
its activities are clearly in the public interest; 
(2) of such unique character that chartering by the Congress as a Federal 
corporation is the only appropriate form of incorporation; 
(3) organized and operated solely for charitable, literary, educational, scientific, 
patriotic, or civic improvement purposes; 
(4) organized and operated as a nonpartisan and non-profit organization; and 
(5) organized and operated for the primary purpose of conducting activities 
which are of national scope and responsive to a national need, which need 
cannot be met except upon the issuance of a Federal charter. 
The meeting of the minimum standards as set forth by any private corporation 
shall not 
(1) be considered as justification in itself for the granting of a Federal charter; 
or 
(2) preclude or limit the Congress from imposing additional criteria or stan• 
dards with respect to the granting of a charter to any organization. 
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educational, scientific, patriotic, or civic improvement purposes," and 
that its primary purpose be to conduct activities that are "clearly in 
the public interest," of "national scope," and "responsive to a na-
tional need, which need cannot be met except upon the issuance of 
a Federal charter."64 
Although the close congressional scrutiny evident in the new 
standards does not, in itself, imply a legislative intent to prohibit 
discrimination, the reason for the scrutiny-to ensure that charters 
are grant<rd only to groups worthy of official acclaim-does imply 
such an intent. Senator Hruska summarized the reason for granting 
charters: "Very simply put, if the Congress enacts legislation granting 
a Federal charter to a nonprofit organization it-confers on t!J.at orga-
nization mainly one benefit; that is, the prestige of setting out on 
their [sic] letterhead that it has been granted a Federal charter by 
act of Congress."65 Hruska's perception of legislative intent in grant-
ing a charter is well documented in reports recommending incorpo-
ration of particular groups. Thus, the Senate report introducing the 
Girl Scout bill states: "Because Congressional Charters are granted 
as marks of distinction to organizations whose public service is unique 
in scope and value, the friends of Girl Scouting believe that the 
deserved prestige of such a charter should be conferred on the Girl 
Scouts of the U.S.A."66 • Other reports contain such statements as 
"the granting of a Federal charter would be an appropriate recog-
nition of the national stature which Little League has attained and 
will encourage its further development ... " 67 and "[t]he organization 
will also acquire the respect and stature which accrue only to orga-
nizations with congressional recognition."68 In short, a federal char-
ter is a declaration that a group serves the public interest, is of 
national scope, and is worthy of setting out on its letterhead a. con-
gressional mark of distinction. Invidious discrimination by such a 
group is surely contrary to congressional intent, and argues for the 
recognition of an implied prohibition against discrimination that is 
repugnant to federal public policy. 
An implied prohibition also finds support in · the legislative 
history of several charter grants. In discussing the proposed incor-
poration of the Girl Scouts in 1950, Congress noted that the organiza-
tion was "nonsectarian and ... open to all ... regardless of economic 
64. See note 63 supra. 
65. Hearings on S. 902, S. 913, S. 1281, S. 2337, S. 2509, and S. 2529 Before the 
Subcomm. on Federal Charters, Holidays, and Celebratio~ of the Senate Comm. on 
the Judidary, 92d Cong., 1st Sessi 69 (1971) (remarks of Senator Hruska) [hereinafter 
1971 Senate Hearings]. 
66. GIRL SCOUT REPORT, supra note 54, at 2. 
67. S. REP. No. 1154, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964). 
68. S. REP. No. 92-323, .92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971). 
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status, race, or creed."69 On another occasion it was noted that the 
Veterans of World War I was open to "any American citizen •.• 
who has been honorably discharged."7° Concern over discrimination 
by chartered groups was clearly e:xpressed in the debate over the 
incorporation of the Jewish War Veterans. Responding to objections 
that a charter should not be granted to a group open only to Jews, 
the Senate Judiciary Report and various congresspersons repeatedly 
observed that the proposed bill "does not call for a charter to a mem-
bership organization; the bill is in the nature of a charter to a memo-
rial . . . . [T]here is a definite distinction between the two."71 The 
speakers apparently agreed that a membership organization would be 
granted a federal charter only if it were open to "all veterans, regard-
less of race, color, or creed.''72 
Additional support for the recognition of an implied statutory 
prohibition against discriminatory membership policies may, in 
many cases, be found in the charter provisions setting forth the 
purposes of the incorporated group. The Marine Corps League 
charter, for instance, states a purpose of "fit[ting] its members for 
the duties of citizenship and encourag[ing] them to serve .•. ably 
as citizens.''73 The charter of the United States Olympic Committee 
states purposes of "instill[ing] and develop[ing] •.. the qualities of 
... tolerance, and like virtues; and ... promot[ing] and encourag[ing] 
the ... moral ... and cultural education of the youth of the United 
States to the end that their ... patriotism, character, and good citizen-
ship may be fully developed.''74 Such noble purposes are incapable of 
precise definition, but they arguably foreclose membership practices 
that are at odds with federal public policy. The court in In re Gal-
laher v. American Legion75 relied in part on such reasoning to strike 
down a Legion regulation that was found "out of harmony with the 
noble ideals for which [that] fine organization was founded.'' 70 
69. GIRL SCOUT REPORT, supra note 54, at 2. 
70. 104 CONG, REc. 12224 (1958) (remarks of Congressman Lane). 
71. 104 CONG. REc. 18195 (1958) (remarks of Senator Dirksen). See also S. REP. No. 
2420, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958) ("It is to be noted that [the bill] does not grant a 
Federal charter to the membership organization • • , but rather is limited to the 
national memorial.''). 
72. 104 CONG. REc. 18195 (1958) (remarks of Senator Hickenlooper). 
78. 86 U.S.C. § 57a (1970). 
74. 36 u.s.a. § 373 (1970). 
75. 154 Misc. 281, 277 N.Y.S. 81 (Sup. Ct.), afjd. mem., 242 App. Div. 60,i, 271 
N.Y.S. 1012 (1934). 
76. 154 Misc. at 285, 277 N.Y.S. at 85. See text accompanying notes 36,37 supra. 
See also Reiter v. American Legion, 189 Misc. 1053, 72 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct.), affd. 
mem., 273 App. Div. 757, 75 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1947), appeal denied, 273 App. Div. 877, 77 
N.Y.S.2d 391 (1948), in which the court looked to several federal statutes to decide 
whether the Legion could exclude communists without violating the charter's man-
date that the organization be "nonpolitical.'' 
The ultra vires doctrine, which establishes that acts transcending a corporation's 
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Finally, an implied prohibition against discrimination is suggested 
by the serious constitutional problems raised in its absence.77 
Recognition of an implied statutory prohibition is only a first 
step in deciding a given case; the nature of the prohibition remains 
to be determined, with the attendant difficulty of assessing federal 
public policy with respect to various private discriminations. Several 
recent tax cases illustrate the use of federal policy in construing 
statutes and the delicate balancing involved in reading statutes to 
forbid discrimination by private groups. 
In Green v. Connally,78 a three-judge district court held that pri-
vate racially restrictive schools were not "charitable" under section 
50l(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, defining tax-exempt organiza-
tions, and section l 70(c), allowing deductions for certain charitable 
contributions. After discussing whether an educational institution 
that practices racial discrimination could qualify as a charitable trust 
under the common law of trusts, the court concluded that the proper 
interpretative guide was federal public policy, not the common law: 
Taking into account the sensitive and crucial nature of the issue 
of racially discriminatory schools and the existence ... of a federal 
policy derived from Congressional enactment as well as the Consti-
tution itself, it is our conclusion that the ultimate criterion for 
determination whether such schools are eligible under the "char-
itable" organization provisions of the Code rests not on a common 
law referent but on that Federal policy.79 
Assessing the federal policy against race discrimination, Judge 
Leventhal first pointed to the thirteenth amendment's authorization 
of congressional legislation "abolishing all badges and incidents of 
slavery,"80 noting that the amendment applies to privately, as well 
as publicly, imposed badges. He then cited Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion81 and its progeny as evidence of a broad policy against discrimi-
enumerated powers are without effect, is the technical underpinning of this line of 
argument. Though the movement to virtually unlimited corporate powers has di-
minished the importance of ultra vires as a business corporation theory, it ''has a 
continuing vitality in the realm of the nonprofit corporations where purposes are 
central to the whole concept." Moody, Nonprofit Corporations-A Survey of Recent 
Cases, 21 CLEV. STATE L. REv. 26, 39 (1972). See, e.g., Bajdek v. Board of Trustees of 
the Am. Legion Pulaski Post No. 357 Trust, 132 Ind. App. 116, 173 N.E.2d 61 (1961); 
Wing Memorial Hosp. Assn. v. Town of Randolph, 120 Vt. 277, 141 A.2d 645 (1957). 
77. Cf. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 tJ.S. 192 (1944). See Part 
IV infra. It should be noted that these arguments do not apply to state incorporation. 
State charters are freely granted and are not "badges of acclaim"; they are intended 
only to allow the use of the corporate form. Furthermore, state incorporation of 
discriminatory groups raises no constitutional problems. See text accompanying notes 
166-73 infra. 
78. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). 
79. 330 F. Supp. at 1161. 
80. 330 F. Supp. at 1163, quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
81. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). . 
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nation in public schools and several congressional enactments as 
indicative of a policy against federal support for discriminatory 
private schools. However, he was careful to consider competing 
policies before concluding that the challenged provisions of the tax 
code did not apply to racially discriminatory schools: 
This principle [of construing the Internal Revenue Code so as not 
to contravene federal public policy] cannot be applied without tak-
ing into account that as to private philanthropy, the promotion of a 
healthy pluralism is often viewed as a prime social benefit of general 
significance .... This decentralized choice-making is arguably more 
efficient and responsive to public needs than the cumbersome and 
less flexible allocation process of government administration. 
The indulgence of individual whim or preference has values but 
like all principles it cannot be pushed beyond sound limits to ex-
tremes that cannot be approved .... We are persuaded that there is 
a declared Federal public policy against support for racial discrim-
ination in education which overrides any assertion of value in prac-
ticing private racial discrimination, whether ascribed to philosophical 
pluralism or divine inspiration for racial segregation.B2 
The following year another three-judge court construed the 
charitable deduction and exemption provisions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code as applied to racially discriminatory fraternal orders. The 
court in McGlotten v. Connally83 again looked to the thirteenth 
amendment and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.84 to find a constitu-
tional policy against public and private race discrimination. It then 
turned to what it termed "an analogous area,"811 section 601 of the 
Civil Rights Act of I 964, 86 prohibiting racial discrimination by those 
receiving federal financial assistance, and found a "clearly indicated 
-Congressional policy that the beneficiaries of federal largesse should 
not discriminate."87 Thus, it concluded, "this overriding public policy 
.•. requires that the Code not be construed to allow the deduction 
of contributions to organizations which excluded nonwhites from 
membership."88 
82. 330 F. Supp. at 1162-63. 
83. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972). 
84. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
85. 338 F. Supp. at 460. 
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). 
87. 338 F. Supp. at 460. 
88. 338 F. Supp. at 460. The McGlotten court discussed two other theories leading 
to the same result: (I) The tax benefits constituted federal "subsidies" that if granted 
to a racially restrictive fraternal order would violate the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment (see text accompanying notes 152·59 infra); (2) the tax benefits 
resulted in violations of § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d 
(1970), prohibiting discrimination in "any program or activity receiving Federal finan• 
dal assistance." 
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McGlotten, although providing support for the use of federal 
public policy as a tool of statutory interpretation, illustrates the 
difficulty in accurately assessing that policy. Professors Bittker and 
Kaufman criticize the decision for failing to consider associational 
rights of purely private clubs and for failing to ·mention section 201 
(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 196489 and section 807 of the Civil 
Rights Act of ~968,90 which expressly exempt private clubs from pro-
hibitions against discrimination in public' accommodations and fed-
erally financed housing.91 Apparently, Bittker and Kaufman 
do not dispute the existence of a policy against federal support of 
race discrimination; their criticism is directed to the court's failure 
adequately to consider competing concerns for freedom of associa-
tion. By overlooking those instances in which Congress weighed its 
concern for civil rights against interests of private clubs and struck 
a balance in favor of the latter, the McGlotten court undervalued 
the express legislative interest in preserving private rights of associa-
tion. The undervaluation is particularly serious when the result of 
the implied statutory prohibition has a significant impact on private 
rights. Clearly, then, the distress of Professors Bittker and Kaufman 
results from their belief that excluding discriminatory organizations 
from the special tax status provisions forces the organizations to pay 
too high a price for their right to associate as they please.92 
The assessment of federal public policy is less difficult in federal 
charter cases than in the context of construing the Internal Revenue 
Code. The constitutional and statutory referents relied upon by the 
McGlotten court are still relevant to show an antidiscriminatory 
policy, but a court may also be guided by explicit congressional 
expressions against discrimination in the federal charter context.93 
More significantly, reading federal charters to prohibit certain dis-
crimination does not result in as heavy an impact on associational 
freedoms as results in the tax cases. While an organization must 
make the same choice-governmental benefit or discriminatory 
practices-the price for choosing to discriminate is less severe. 
Relinquishment of a charter is much less likely to endanger the 
group's survival.than is forfeiture of "charitable" status under the 
income tax laws.94 Thus, though an implied statutory prohibition 
against discrimination must be separately considered for different 
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970). 
90. 42 u.s.c. § 3607 (1970). 
91. Bittker &: Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal 
Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51, 76-78 (1972). 
92. Bittker &: Kaufman, supra note 91, at 86. 
93. See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra. 
94. See text accompanying notes 145-47 infra. 
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types of discrimination and different charters,00 it may be justified 
even by a relatively weak expression of federal policy. 
95. An implied prohibition against racial discrimination is the easiest case, The 
strength of the public policy against racism is indicated by the thirteenth, fourteenth, 
and fifteenth amendments, and by statutes forbidding racial discrimination in public 
education, Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 401-10, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9 (1970); 
federally assisted programs, Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C, § 2000d (1970): 
public accommodations, Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201, 42 U.S.C, § 2000a (1970); 
public facilities, Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 301, 42 U.S.C. § 2000b (1970); employment 
opportunities, Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970): 
and housing. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970). Moreover, Congress has specificaUy dis• 
approved of racial discrimination by federally chartered groups. See text accompany-
ing notes 69-72 supra. Although there are situations in which Congress has expressly 
refused to prohibit discrimination by private groups (see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(e), 
e(b)(2), 3607 (1970), exempting private clubs from statutes prohibiting discrimination 
in public accommodations, employment opportunities, and federally financed housing), 
the weight of the policy, especially where associational interests would not be dras• 
tically infringed, supports the implied statutory prohibition, 
Religious discrimination presents allllost as compelling a case. The policy of 
separation of church and state is of course arr integral part of the first amendment, 
and religious discrimination is prohibited under most of the provisions of the civil 
rights legislation cited above. However, competing concerns-respect for associational 
freedoms and the free e.xercise of religion-have also been recognized by Congress, 
In addition to the private club exemptions mentioned above, religious enterprises 
are exempted from equal employment provisions with respect to the employment of 
individuals of particular religions to perform work connected with the carrying on 
of their activities, Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702, 42 U.S.C, § 2000e-1 (1970); the 
fair housing statute is not applicable to dwellings owned or operated by religious 
groups for noncommercial purposes (unless the religion restricts membership on the 
basis of race, color, or national origin), 42 U.S.C, § 3607 (1970); and the prohibition 
of sex discrimination in federally assisted educational programs is not applicable to 
institutions controlled by religious organizations if compliance would be inconsistent 
with religious tenets, 20 U.S.C.A. § 168I(a)(3) (Supp, 1974). Such e.xceptions, however, 
indicate at most a tolerance for religious discrimination insofar as it furthers the 
purposes of religious groups. If this is not the case-if, for example, the Boy Scouts 
require a belief in God as a precondition of membership (see text accompanying notes 
12-13 supra)-an implied prohibition against religious discrimination falls clearly 
within federal public policy. Again, the minimal impact of the prohibition upon 
associational and free exercise rights is significant. 
Sex discrimination presents the hardest case, because of a weaker c....:pression 0£ 
federal policy. Nevertheless, "Congress has . • , manifested an increasing sensitivity 
to sex-based classifications." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973). Thus, 
sex discrimination is prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)(2)(a)-(d) (1970); under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206(d) (1970); and most recently under 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-86 (Supp. 1974), pm• 
hibiting sex discrimination in federally assisted educational programs. Furthermore, 
Congress has passed and submitted to the states for ratification the Equal Rights 
Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess, (1972), which declares that 
"[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of sex." The foregoing enactments have led four 
members of the Supreme Court to state that "Congress itself bas concluded that 
classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, •• ," Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973). Despite the growth of this policy, some sex discrimination 
is carried on with congressional approval. Colleges that have "traditionally and 
continually" admitted students of one sex are exempted from antidiscriminatory 
requirements for federally assisted educational programs. 20 U.S.C.A. § 168l(a)(6) 
(Supp. 1974). Furthermore, Congress approved a "separate but equal" philosophy by 
granting a federal charter to the Girl Scouts with an expressed purpose of "giv[ing] 
the same prestige to the girls of America as has been given to the boys." 96 CoNC, REc, 
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IV, GOVERNMENTAL ACTION 
Many discriminatory membership practices that raise substantial 
constitutional questions may be dealt with by an implied statutory 
prohibition. However, there are situations in which a prohibition can-
not be read into a charter, making the constitutional issues unavoid-
able. One such situation involves charters that expressly mandate 
discrimination. The charter of the Sons of Union Veterans of the 
Civil War, for example, restricts membership eligibility to "male 
blood relatives" of union soldiers,96 and the charters of the Little 
League and the VFW arguably restrict membership to males.97 
Similarly, a charter expressly reserving to an organization the power 
to select members on the basis of race or national origin, for example, 
would resist the statutory analysis suggested above, although it is 
improbable that such a charter would be granted. Finally, even a· 
charter that is silent on membership restrictions may not be suscepti-
ble to the statutory analysis if granted to an organization with a clear 
history of discrimination.98 If constraints on membership. policies are 
to be found in these situations they must derive from the Constitu-
tion. 
The relevant constitutional provision-the fifth amendment's 
prohibition of unreasonable discrimination99-applies only to govem-
1812 (1950) (remarks of Representative Norton). Nevertheless, though an implied 
prohibition against se.x discrimination may not be justified for all federally chartered 
groups, distinctions may be made. For example, veterans groups, in contrast to the 
Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts, have a sexually neutral purpose, and Congress has ex-
pressed the concern that they be open to all. See text accompanying notes 70-72 
supra. It would not be unreasonable, therefore, to read an implied prohibition against 
sex discrimination into the charters of such groups as the VFW. 
96. 36 u.s.c. § 535 (1970). 
97. The Little League charter states, in part: "The objects and purposes of the 
corporation shall be ••• [t]o promote, develop, supervise, and voluntarily assist in 
all lawful ways the interest of boys who will participate in Little League baseball •••• 
To help and voluntarily assist boys in developing qualities of citizenship, sportsman-
ship, and manhood." Act of July 16, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-378, § 3, 78 Stat. 325 
(emphasis added). But see National Organization of Women v. Little League Baseball, 
Inc., Docket No. A-1313--73 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div.), appeal docketed, No. 10588, 
N.J. Sup. Ct., May 7, 1974. The VFW charter states: "No person shall be a member 
of this corporation unless he has served honorably as an officer or enlisted man 
in the Armed Forces of the United States of America •••• " 36 U.S.C. § 115 (1970) 
{emphasis added), But see Stearns v. VFW, 353 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1972), revd. on 
other grounds, No. 73--1197 (D.C. Cir, June 19, 1974), where the court found the VFW 
charter ambiguous, and held that "[t]he use of the pronoun 'he' and the words 
'enlisted man' cannot reasonably be construed to be anything more than grammatical 
imprecision •••• " 353 F. Supp. at 475. The court noted that the VFW itself did not 
feel constrained by the charter; it had voted on (but defeated) an amendment to its 
constitution that would have allowed the admission of females. 353 F. Supp. at 476. 
98. However, it may still be possible to construe the charter to prohibit the dis-
crimination. One may argue that clear congressional pronouncements against similar 
discrimination in other areas should be given decisive weight unless Congress specifi-
cally provides otherwise. 
99. Although the fifth amendment contains no explicit equal protection guarantee 
against actions by the federal government, such a guarantee has been found implicit 
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ment actions. Thus, "private conduct abridging individual rights 
d~es no violence to the [right to equal protection] unless to some 
significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been 
found to have become involved in it."100 When there is sufficient 
involvement, the activities of the private party are "tantamount to 
governmental action,"101 so that either the actor is bound by consti-
tutional prohibitions or the government must disengage itself.102 
in the concept of "due process." See, e.g., Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) 
("[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid 
discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.'') Accorcl, 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 n.5 (1973). Although the Court has never 
expressly declared that the fifth amendment equal protection guarantee exactly 
parallels the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment, fifth amend• 
ment cases freely use fourteenth amendment precedent. See, e.g., United States Dept, 
of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973). 
100. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. '115, 722 (1961). See also 
Public Util. Commn. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). 
101. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 
133 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). Although different criteria may be relevant when 
considering federal action as opposed to state action, the cases do not make this 
distinction. Compare Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972): Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (state action cases) with Columbia 
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Public Util. 
Commn. v. Pollak, 348 U.S. 451 (1952) (federal action cases). 
102. This Note will discuss only the involvement that inheres in the grant of a 
federal charter per se. Other factors may be relevant and should be considered in 
particular cases. In the Little League cases, for example, a finding of state action is 
given added support by the group's use of public school fields and other municipal 
facilities. Also, many chartered groups enjoy favorable tax status under the income 
tax laws. See Stearns v. VFW, No. 73-1197, slip op. at 3-4 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 1974), 
The Note will also discuss governmental action only with respect to equal protection 
rights against discriminatory membership policies. Although the issue is not settled, 
cases suggest that different degrees of governmental involvement are necessary to 
activate different constitutional restrictions. See, e.g., Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 
- 478 F.2d 1137, 1142 (2d Cir. 1973) (involving due process rights in an c.'Cpulsion from 
a private law school): "[W]hile a grant or other index of state involvement may be 
impermissible when it 'fosters or encourages' discrimination on the basis of race, the 
same limited involvement may not rise to the level of 'state action' when the action 
in question is alleged to affront other constitutional rights." See also Jackson v. 
Statler Foundation, No. 73-1543, slip op. 2747-50 (2d Cir. April 5, 1974); Pitts 
v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662, 668-69 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Comment, Ta~ 
Incenfives as State Action, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 414, 445-47 (1973). Due process rights in 
the charter context are in any case largely unnecessary; similar rights, which do not de• 
pend on governmental action, have evolved under the common law. See text accom-
panying notes 17-35 supra. Although the state action requirement is unclear in due 
process cases, it is clear that greater govenunental involvement is required to invoke 
the establishment clause than the equal protection clause, as indicated in Norwood 
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469-70 (1973): 
(T]he transcendent value of free religious c.'Cerdse in our constitutional scheme 
leaves room for "play in the joints" to the extent of cautiously delineated secular 
governmental assistance to religious schools, despite the fact that such assistance 
touches on the conflicting values of the Establishment Clause by indirectly bcne• 
fiting the religious schools and their sponsors. 
In contrast, although the Constitution does not proscribe private bias, it places 
no value on discrimination as it does on the values inherent in the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
An establishment of religion claim, however, is unlikely to arise in the charter context, 
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If a federal charter mandates the challenged discrimination a 
finding of governmental action is almost axiomatic. The Supreme 
Court has explicitly held that "a State is responsible for the dis-
criminatory act of a private party when the State, by its law, has 
compelled the act."103 If the governmental action were then held to 
violate a substantive constitutional restraint the court would prob-
ably declare the charter invalid insofar as it mandated the discrimina-
tion and enjoin its future enforcement.104 In Moose Lodge No. 107 
v. Irvis10u the Court even enjoined enforcement of a liquor license 
regulation that required the licensee to adhere to all the provisions 
of its own constitution and bylaws. Acknowledging that the regula-
tion was neutral on its face, the Court held that applying it to a 
licensee whose bylaws required discrimination would result in invok-
ing the sanctions of the state to enforce a discriminatory private 
rule.100 Such an injunction in a federal charter case .would have little 
impact on an excluded applicant's chances for membership. After the 
invalid provision is stricken, the group would be free to retain its 
charter and continue discriminating on its own volition.107 If this 
future discrimination is to be restricted, it is necessary to ask whether 
the grant of a federal charter per se is sufficient to subjec~ a chartered 
group to constitutional restraints. 
If a charter does not directly compel discrimination (either 
because it is neutral on its face or because its command to discrimi-
nate will not be enforced) its constitutional significance is difficult 
tG assess. Few cases deal with the issue. In Reiter v. American 
Legion,1°8 the plaintiff was expelled from the Legion because of his 
affiliation with the Communist Party. He argued that the expulsion 
infringed upon his freedom of speech, but the court noted that the 
because Congress has been reticent to charter religious membership groups. See text 
accompanying notes 71-72 supra. Furthermore, religious discrimination by a nonsec-
tarian group, such as the Boy Scouts, is probably better analyzed as an equal protec-
tion case than as an establishment clause case. 
103. Adickes v. S. H. Kress&: Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970). However, whether or not 
a charter mandates discrimination may be a litigable issue. See note 97 supra. The 
state is also responsible where it merely authorizes or encourages discrimination. See 
Norwood v. Harrison, 143 U.S. 455, 465 (1973); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 
(1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). ' 
104. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress&: Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970). 
105. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
106. 407 U.S. at 178-79. 
107. Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 
435 (1970). Moose Lodge, by implication, weakens the argument tha~ the discrimina-
tory charter, in effect, makes the group an irrevocable agent of the state. But 'cf. 
Jackson v. Statler Foundation, No. 73-1543, slip op. at 2767 (2d Cir. April 5, 19'74) 
(Friendly, J., dissenting); Bittker &: Kaufman, supra note 91, at 60. 
108. 189 Misc. 1053, 72 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct.), afjd. mem., 273 App. Div. 757, 75 
N.Y.S.2d 530 (1947), appeal denied, 278 App. Div, 877, 77 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1948). 
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first amendment protects an individual only against governmental 
action and concluded that "[t]he mere circumstance that The Ameri-
can Legion exists under a Federal charter, rather than as an un• 
incorporated association, or as a State-incorporated membership 
corporation, would seem without significance in this respect.''100 
Reiter cannot be afforded great weight. Its analysis is conclusory and 
it was decided in 1947, before the expansive development of modem 
governmental action doctrine. The most recent case, Stearns v. 
VFW,110 is somewhat more helpful. The plaintiff, excluded from 
the VFW because of her sex, argued that the grant of a federal 
charter to the VFW "constitute[d] the kind of significant state 
involvement in private discriminations that is violative of the equal 
protection guarantee in the due process clause of the Fifth Amend• 
ment."lll The district court responded " •.. it does not. Cf. Moose 
Lodge No. 107 V'. Irvis ... ,"112 but the court of appeals reversed this 
summary dismissal.113 Remanding the case for "further examina• 
tion/'114 the court urged consideration of the following factors, in 
addition to the grant of the federal charter: the requirement of 
presentations to Congress of annual reports of proceedings and audits 
of finances; the VFW's entitlement to loans or gifts of condemned or 
obsolete com~at material; its special federal income ta.x status as a 
chatitable organization; and the authorization of the Administrator 
of the Veterans Administration to recognize representatives of the 
VFW for the purpose of prosecuting claims under laws administered 
by the Veterans Administration, and the further authorization to 
furnish office space to VFW representatives.115 While the court stated 
that "we are inclined to agree that Congressional chartering alone 
does not constitute significant go"\_"ernment involvement that triggers 
due process guarantees,"116 all but two of the factors it suggested be 
considered on remand are natural concomitants of federal charter-
ing.111 
Perhaps the best way to approach the problem is to examine the 
governmental action doctrine as it has been developed by the Su-
preme Court. Where the alleged governmental action does not 
mandate discrimination the Court has eschewed a rigid formula and 
adopted a "sifting of facts and weighing of circumstances"118 analysis. 
109. 189 Misc. at 1057, 72 N.Y.S.2d at 349. 
no. 353 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1972), revd., No. 73-II97 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 1974). 
Ill. 353 F. Supp. at 475. 
ll2. 353 F. Supp. at 476. 
ll3. No. 73-1197 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 1974). 
II4. No. 73-1197, slip op. at 4. 
ll5. No. 73-ll97, slip op. at 3-4. 
ll6. No. 73-1197, slip op. at 3 (emphasis original). 
II7. See note 142 infra and accompanying text, 
IIS. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). 
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The Court's "sifting and weighing" gives recognition to two compet-
ing general principles. On the one hand, as Justice Brennan stated: 
The state-action doctrine reflects the profound judgment that denials 
of equal treatment ... are singularly grave when government has or 
shares responsibility for them. Government is the ~ocial organ to 
which all in our society lo_ok for the promotion of liberty, justice, 
£air and equal treatment, and the setting of worthy norms and goals 
for social conduct. Therefore something is uniquely amiss in a so-
ciety where the government, the authoritative oracle of community 
values, involves itself in ... discrimination.110 
On the other hand, the doctrine reflects a respect for individual 
choice and a desire to protect genuinely private concerns. In the 
words of Judge Friendly, "courts should pay heed, in testing £or gov-
ernment action, to the 'value of preserving a private sector free from 
the constitutional requirements applicable to government institu-
tions.' "120 
Two landmark Supreme Court decisions il!:ystrate the difficulty 
in reconciling these principles. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority,121 the Court held that racial discrimination in a privately 
ovmed restaurant that leased space in a state agency's parking build-
ing was not so purely private as to be outside the scope of the four-
teenth amendment. The factors the Court found relevant included 
public ownership of the land and building and the use of public 
fonds for its maintenance and upkeep, enjoyment of "mutual bene-
fits" by the lessor and lessee (such as parking convenience for 
restaurant guests and increased demand for parking because of the 
restaurant), the fact that the discrimination created profits that were 
indispensable elements in the financial success of the governmental 
agency, and finally the fact that the state could have required its 
tenant to discharge its responsibilities under the fourteenth amend-
ment.122 The Court concluded that "[t]he State [had] so far insinu-
ated itself into a position of interdependence with [the lessee] that 
it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged 
activity,"123 thus subjecting the activity to the mandates of the 
fourteenth amendment. Responding to the fear of "nigh universal 
application"124 of its holding, the Court was careful to point out 
that its conclusions were not "universal truths on the basis of which 
119. Adickes v. S. H. Kress &: Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190-91 (1970) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
120. Jackson v. Statler Foundation, No. 73-1543, slip op. ;it 2771 (2d Cir. April 5, 
1974) (Friendly, J., dissenting), quoting Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 102 
(2d Cir. 1974). 
121. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
122. 365 U.S. at 723-25. 
123. 365 U.S. at 725. 
124. 36!> u.s. at 726, 
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every state leasing agreement is to be tested,"12is but rather were 
limited to the manner and purpose of the leasing in the case as 
presented. 
Eleven years later, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,126 the Court 
assessed the significance of a state's grant of a liquor license to ~ 
private club, and, in so doing, emphasized its concern with maintain-
ing a line between private and governmental action: 
The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an 
otherwise private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection 
Clause if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or service at 
all from the State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree 
whatever. Since state-furnished services include such necessities of 
life as electricity, water, and police and fire protection, such a holding 
would utterly emasculate the distinction between private as distin-
guished from state conduct set forth in The Civil Rights Cases .•• 
and adhered to in subsequent decisions.127 
Concluding that the grant of a liquor license and concomitant state 
regulation did not make the Lodge's action governmental action, 
the Court distinguished Burton by noting that in Moose Lodge there 
was no "symbiotic relationship" or exchange of mutual benefits, the 
land upon which the Lodge was situated was privately owned, the 
Lodge had not proclaimed itself to be open to the public, and it 
did not perform a function that "would otherwise in all likelihood 
be performed by the State."128 
Although Justice Douglas dissented, he too noted concern for a 
constitutionally protected "zone of privacy,"120 and recognized that 
the mere grant of a state permit would not make the recipient ipso 
facto a public enterprise or undertaking, "any more than the grant 
to a household of a permit to operate an incinerator puts the house-
-holder in the public domain."130 He was able to distinguish Moose 
Lodge, however, by emphasizing an administrative requirement that 
every liquor licensee comply with all of its own rules, including in 
this case a discriminatory membership provision, and a state-enforced 
scarcity of licenses that gave the holder a monopolistic advantage 
both in selling liquor and ultimately in transferring the license.181 
"Thus," he concluded, "the State of Pennsylvania is putting the 
weight of its liquor license, concededly a valued and important 
125. 365 U.S. at 725. 
126. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
127. 407 U.S. at 173. 
128. 407 U.S. at 175. 
129. 407 U.S. at 179. 
130. 407 U.S. at 180. 
l;ll. 407 U.S. at 181-8;1, 
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adjunct to a private club, behind racial discrimination."182 Impor-
tantly, the majority and dissent disagreed primarily on their assess-
ments of the facts-Justice Rehnquist had asserted that the quota · 
system fell "far short of conferring . . . a monopoly."133 Their con-
ception of state action as a "sifting and weighing" of governmental 
involvement versus private associational interests was the same. 
Burton and Moose Lodge support the holding that a grant of a 
federal charter is sufficient governmental involvement to impose 
equal protection limitations on a recipient's membership policies.134 
Such a holding is consistent with the principles behind the govern-
mental action concept; the charter context presents clear indicia of 
governmental involvement and a governmental action holding would 
have few adverse effects on 'associational rights or private philan-
thropy. Moreover, a comparison of federal charters with other gov-
ernmental benefits and regulation indicates that such a holding 
would not threaten the distinction between public and private 
action and, in fact, would go no further than present cases. 
As in Burton and Moose Lodge, the government's action is 
straightfonvard. Congress passes laws granting charters as "marks 
of distinction,''135 so that the recipients may "acquire the respect 
and stature which accrue only to organizations with congressional 
recognition.''136 Furthermore, though prestige is the most significant 
benefit of a federal charter, other advantages may exist. President 
Johnson observed that the grant of a charter to one organization 
may discriminate against similar organizations and possibly stifle 
their growth.137 Also, in most states federal corporations are deemed 
domestic as opposed to foreign for certain purposes, thus, for ex-
ample, relieving them of the need to acquire authorizations to trans-
act business.138 
Benefits also flow to the government. Because chartered groups 
are by definition organized "solely for charitable, literary, educa-
tional, scientific, or civic improvement purposes,"139 their activities 
132. 407 U.S. at 183. 
133. 407 U.S. at 177. 
134. See note 102 supra. 
135. GIRL SCOOT REPORT, supra note 54, at 2. 
136. S. REP. No. 92-323, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971). 
137. See note 61 supra. 
138. See, e.g., Home Owner's Loan Corp. v. Stookey, 59 Idaho 267, 81 P.2d 1096 
(1938); Lawn Sav. and Loan Assn. v. Quinn, 81 Ill. App. 2d 304, 225 N.E.2d 683 
(1967); Severson v. Home Owner's Loan Corp., 184 Okla. 496, 88 P.2d 344 (1939); 
Dodson v. Home Owner's Loan Corp., 123 S.W .2d 435 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1938). See 
also Homan v. Connett, 348 Mo. 244, 152 S.W .2d 1053 (1941) (federal corporation 
domestic and therefore not prohibited from acting as trustee in deed of trust or 
other conveyance); Gould v. Texas and Pac. Ry. Co., 176 App. Div. 818, 163 N.Y.S. 
479 (1917) (federal corporation domestic and therefore not subject to attachment). 
139. See note 63 supra. 
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often substitute for services that are otherwise performed by gov-
emment.140 The American National Red Cross, for instance, provides 
disaster relief and wartime aid services that elsewhere are tradi-
tionally provided by the state. Congress expressly recognizes and 
indeed requires a quid pro quo for the grant of a charter by specify-
ing that the chartered grqup be "responsive to a national need, which 
need cannot be met except upon the issuance of a Federal charter."141 
One may characterize this flow of "mutual benefits" as a "symbiotic 
relationship," such as was found in .Burton and lacking in Moose 
Lodge. 
Finally, it should be noted that there is some continuous congres-
sional regulation in the audit of federally chartered nonprofit 
corporations required to be submitted annually to Congress.142 
The significance of this governmental involvement cannot, of 
course, be assessed in the abstract. Before concluding that the 
involvement is sufficient to invoke constitutional limitations, one 
must consider the competing interests-in this case, a respect for the 
140. Cf. Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887, 888 (D. Ore. 
1972), appeal dismissed sub nom. Oregon State Elks Assn. v. Falkenstein, 409 U,S, 
1099 (1973); Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662, 667 n.10 (E.D. Wis. 
1971). See note 154 infra and accompanying text. 
141. See note 63 supra. 
142. 36 U.S.C. §§ 1101-03 (1970). Many federally chartered groups must also sub• 
mit to Congress annual reports of their proceedings. See, e.g., 36 U.S.C. § 28 (1070) 
(Boy Scouts); 36 U.S.C. § 118 (1970) (VFW). Particular cases may have additional in-
dicia of governmental involvement. See note 102 supra. 
The argument may be made that the grant of a federal charter should not lead 
to a holding of governmental action because there is an insufficient "nexus" be-
tween the governmental involvement and the discrimination. Cases involving chal-
lenges to the membership policies of otherwise private organizations indicate some 
confusion regarding the exact nexus required. In Junior Chamber of Commerce v. 
United States Jaycees (10th Cir. April 16, 1974) (excerpted in 112 U.S.L.W. 2570) the 
court refused to find the Jaycees' discriminatory policy subject to constitutional con• 
straints by virtue of the organization's administration of government funds. Although 
acknowledging that a constitutional violation might exist if the money were dis• 
tributed in a discriminatory manner, the court held that there was not a sufficient 
nexus between the group's membership policy and the alleged state action, The court 
in McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972), however, rejected a similar 
contention: ''We do not find lt significant that plaintiff does not allege ••• that 
the charitable purposes to which the federal funds are put are in themselves dis-
criminatory. Plaintiff alleges that he and others in his position are denied the oppor• 
tunity to help determine the purposes to which the funds are devoted. Paternalism 
should not be confused with equality." 338 F. Supp. at 456 n.38. Whatever the status 
of the nexus requirement, it is met in the federal charter situation. The government 
does not merely funnel money through private hands, in which case the only question 
may be the nature of the activities so financed. By granting a federal charter Congress 
selectively places its "stamp of approval" on a membership organization in its 
entirety. Frequently, the main function of the organization is to benefit its own mem-
bers; thus, when a group such as the Little League or the Boy Scouts selects its 
members the beneficiaries of the government acclaim are defined. This would seem 
to provide a sufficient nexus between the discriminatory activity and the govern-
mental involvement. For a more general discussion of the nexus question, see COIi}· 
went, supra note 102, ;it 4M-3P, 
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right to associate freely and for the advantages of pluralistic philan-
thropy. Judge Friendly eloquently expressed this concern: 
Philanthropy is a delicate plant whose fruits are often better than its 
roots; desire to benefit one's own kind may not be the noblest of mo-
tives but it is not ignoble. It is the very possibility of doing something 
different than government can do, of creating an institution free to 
make choices government cannot-even seemingly arbitrary ones-
·without having to provide a justification that will be examined in a 
court of law, which stimulates much private giving and interest. If 
the private agency must be a replica of the public one, why should 
private citizens give it their money and their time? The case is not 
necessarily altered simply because government has decided to help 
private institutions carry a load they are no longer able to bear alone; 
rather, when the history of our time comes to be written, the de-
velopment of techniques whereby privately managed universities, 
hospitals and social agencies have been assisted to work in tandem 
with state operated institutions will rank high for imagination and 
results.143 
Two important points emerge upon consideration of the inter-
action of the factors discussed above. First, the degree of govern-
mental involvement and the benefit conferred in the grant of a 
federal charter, though possibly of less weight than in Burton, still 
seriously impair the government's stature as a model of justice and 
equality. Because federal charters are granted only in exceptional 
cases and for the primary purpose of bestowing acclaim, they imply 
that Congress has "elected to place its power ... and prestige behind 
the admitted discrimination" and "by its inaction ... has ... made 
itself a party to the refusal"144 of membership. In other words, it is 
not the group's private discrin1ination that offends fundamental 
societal and constitutional values as much as the legitimization and 
approval of the gr-0up that the federal charter represents. 
Second, the considerations that argue against a governmental ac-
tion holding are minimal. The Supreme Court has indicated generally 
that infringement on associational freedom is not to be considered 
decisive in governmental action cases: "[W]e must also be aware 
that the very exercise of the freedom to associate by some may serve 
to infringe that freedom for others. Invidious discrimination takes its 
own toll on the freedom to associate, and it is not subject to 
affirmative constitutional protection when it involves state action."146 
Moreover, regardless of the weight afforded the group's associational 
interests, neither these interests nor society's interest in preserving 
143. H. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CAsE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PEN-
UMBRA 30 (1969). See also Private Associations, supra note 22, at 986-90. 
144. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, '725 (1961). 
145. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 42 U.S.L.W. 4920 (U.S. June 17, 1974). 
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pluralistic philanthropy are significantly impaired by a governmental 
action holding. A group need only relinquish its charter in order to 
restore its "purely private" character.146 Though a disentanglement 
from governmental involvement may restore private status in many 
contexts, the significant point in the federal charter situation is that 
such disentanglement entails little cost. Groups seeking federal 
charters are already incorporated;147 thus, even after relinquishing 
its federal charter, a group can continue to have the legal and eco-
nomic advantages incorporation provides. The only price exacted 
for the retention of discriminatory policies would be the loss of 
congressional acclaim, a loss that, unlike the loss of a tax exemption, 
for instance, does not impair a group's ability to pursue its philan-
thropic endeavors. In addition, no significant legitimate govern-
mental objective in granting a charter is compromised by a conclusion 
of governmental action, even if the charter is relinquished. The 
primary purpose of bestowing acclaim is of course frustrated, but 
it is the very objective of acclaiming a discriminatory group that 
should be held impermissible. In contrast, much governmental in-
volvement aims at promoting public health, safety, or welfare in a 
manner that might be seriously compromised if the private party 
were treated as an arm of the state. In Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,148 for example, plaintiffs 
argued that, in light of the substantial governmental involvement 
in the regulation of broadcast media, the CBS network should be 
considered an agent of the state for the purpose of affording respon-
sible individuals and groups a constitutional right to purchase adver-
tising time to comment on public issues. Although there was no 
majority decision on the governmental action claim,149 those who 
opposed it were concerned with the fact that the objective of the 
government regulation was "to maintain . . . essentially private 
broadcast journalism held only broadly accountable to public interest 
standards."150 A finding of governmental action would jeopardize 
that objective because "[j]oumalistic discretion would in many ways 
be lost to the rigid limitations that the First Amendment imposes on 
govemmerit."151 
146. See note 107 supra. 
147. Prior state incorporation is required of any group seeking a federal charter. 
See note 63 supra. Thus, "[f]avorable consideration by the Congress and approval by 
the President of a charter bill neither add to nor detract from the standing that 
that organization had under its State charter." 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 65, 
at 69. 
148. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
149. Justices Brennan and Marshall found govemmental action. Justices Burger, 
Stewart, and Rehnquist found no governmental action. Justices Blackmun, Powell, 
White, and Douglas did not decide the question. 
150. 412 U.S. at 120. 
151. 412 U.S. at 121. 
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The conclusion that the grant of a federal charter subjects the 
recipient to constitutional restraints gains strong support from recent 
cases finding "state a,ction" in the grant of favorable tax status to 
racially discriminatory groups.152 The tax cases rely primarily on 
two factors: official approval of the recipient groups153 and · the 
mutual benefits resulting from the groups' performance of charitable 
152. See, e.g., Jackson v. Statler Foundation, No. 73-1543 (2d Cir. April 5, 1974) 
(state and federal tax exemptions for private nonprofit foundations held state action); 
Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1972), appeal dis-
missed sub nom. Oregon State Elks Assn. v. Falkenstein, 409 U.S. 1099 (1973) (exemp-
tions from state property and corporate excise taxes for the racially discriminatory 
Elks Lodge held invalid under the equal protection clause); McGlotten ·v. Connally, 
338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (upholding a constitutional challenge to the application 
of Internal Revenue Code provisions for the deduction of charitable contributions 
and the allowance of tax exempt status to racially discriminatory fraternal orders); 
Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971). See generally 
Comment, supra note 102. Cf. Committee for Pub. Educ. &: Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 
413 U.S. 756 (upholding establishment clause challenge to state grant of tax deduc-
tions for tuition payments to certain "nonpublic schools"). But see McCoy v. Schultz, 
31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d ,I 73--477 (D.D.C. 1973). Cf. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 
664 (1970) (disallowing an establishment clause challenge for tax exemptions to reli-
gious entities); Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States Jaycees (10th Cir. April 
16, 1974) (excerpted in 42 U.S.L.W. 2570) (receipt of federal funds by private com-
munity organization for use in community welfare programs held not governmental 
action); Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969) (state tax exemption does 
not make private college "an arm of the State" subjecting it to due procei;s require-
ments in expelling students). 
The relief sought in most of these cases was a withdrawal of government benefits 
rather than an injunction of the discriminatory conduct. The McGlotten court found 
no analytical difference: "[I1he determination of when state involvement is sufficient 
either to bring otherwise private discrimination within the aegis of the Fifth or 
Fourteenth Amendment, or to evoke a duty on the part of the government to pre-
vent that discrimination, has traditionally been styled one of 'state action.' Little 
clarity is gained at this stage by attaching a different label to the same inquiry 
depending on who is the defendant.'' 338 F. Supp. at 455 n.31. The court in Pitts, 
however, suggested that "[t]his difference in posture may bear upon the weight to be 
accorded to the prerogatives of private organizations in balancing them against the 
rights asserted.'' 333 F. Supp. at 666. See also Jackson v. Statler Foundation, No. 
73-1543, slip op. at 2766-67 (2d Cir. April 5, 1974) (Friendly, J., dissenting from the 
denial of reconsideration en bane): "A holding that an othenvise private institution 
has become an arm of the state is much broader and can have far more serious 
consequences than a determination that the state has impermissibly fostered private 
discrimination." If, however, the result of a conclusion of governmental action in 
either ·posture is to put the group to the choice of continuing to receive the gov-
ernmental benefit or continuing to discriminate, it is difficult to see why the weighing 
should be different. 
153. See, e.g., Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887, 889 (D. 
Ore. 1972), appeal dismissed sub nom. Oregon State Elks Assn. v. Falkenstein, 409 
U.S. 1099 (1973): "Moreover, ORS 307.134(l)(c) requires the State, before granting an 
exemption, to find that the fraternal organization engages in benevolent and 
charitable activities 'with the purpose of doing good to others rather than for the 
convenience of its members.' With this finding, Oregon places its stamp of approval 
on the Elks Lodge as an organization that furthers the legislative policy of the 
State.'' See also McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1972) ("Thus 
the government has marked certain organizations as 'Government Approved''') (em-
phasis original). 
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functions.154 Both factors are present in the charter context,1Gli and, 
more importantly, the charter context is not complicated by the 
difficulties presented by the tax cases. 
There aie tw'O significant distinctions. First, the tax cases deal 
with a governmental benefit-the grant of tax exempt "charitable" 
status under the Internal Revenue Code-that, unlike a federal 
charter, does not-single out a specific group for acclaim and does not 
have acclaim as its primary purpose. As Professors Bittker and Kauf-
man have noted, the Internal Revenue Code "is a pudding with 
plums for everyone,"156 making it a difficult task to decide which of 
the Code's many deduction and exemption provisions denote govern-
mental approval of the activities of the recipient and which do not.11i7 
Moreover, finding governmental action in the ta.x cases more seriously 
endangers "[t]he interest in preserving an area of untrammeled 
choice for private philanthropy"158 than would a similar conclusion 
in federal charter cases. As noted earlier, Professors Bittker and 
Kaufman believe that excluding discriminatory organizations from 
the "charitable" provisions of the Code forces the groups to pay too 
high a price for their rights of privacy and free association.1G0 Indeed, 
the denial of tax exempt status may mean the extinction of some 
charitable groups, an effect unlikely to result from the renunciation 
of a federal charter. 
Finally, a conclusion of governmental action in federal charter 
cases will not "utterly emasculate the distinction between private 
as distinguished from State conduct."160 Seemingly analogous situa-
tions, such as those involving state incorporation and licensing, 
are distinguishable.101 
154. See, e.g., Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887, 888 (D. 
Ore. 1972), appeal dismissed sub nom. Oregon State Elks Assn. v. Falkenstein, 409 
- U.S. 1099 (1973): "[T]ax exemptions for fraternal organizations benefit both the State 
and the organizations. Oregon relieves fraternal organizations from the burden of 
property and corporate excise taxes and, in return, the public benefits from the 
charitable and benevolent activities of these organizations. This is the kind of 'sym• 
biotic relationship' that was lacking in Moose Lodge •••• " See also Pitts v. Depart• 
ment of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662, 667 n.10 (E.D. Wis. 1971). 
155. See text accompanying notes 135-36, 139-41. 
156. Bittker & Kaufman, supra note 91, at 86. 
157. Judge Bazelon recognized this problem in McGlotten: 
Every deduction in the ta.x laws provides a benefit to the class who may take 
advant.age of it. And the withdrawal of that benefit would often act as a 
substantial incentive to eliminate the behavior which caused the change in status, 
Yet the provision of an income tax deduction for mortgage interest paid has not 
been held sufficient to make the Federal Government a "joint participant" in the 
bigotry practiced by a homeowner. · 
!!38 F. Supp. at 456 (footnotes omitted). 
158. Jackson v. Statler Foundation, No. 73-1543, slip op. at 2771 (2d Cir, April 
li, 1974) (Friendly, J., dissenting from the denial of reconsideration en bane), 
159. See text accompanying note 92 supra. 
160. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972). 
161. The grant of a franchise to public utilities may also parallel the federal 
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. The Supreme Court162 and several commentators163 indicate that 
state licensing alone should not be held sufficient to place particular 
constitutional limitations on the licensee. Unlike federal charters, 
however, state licenses are not symbols of governmental acclaim but 
are widely used means of regulating public health and safety; a 
license will generally be granted to anyone willing to comply with 
the requirements, be they adequate refrigeration and dish-washing 
in a restaurant or satisfactory plumbing facilities in a home.164 Even 
liquor licensing regulations requiring that the applicant be "a person 
of good repute" and that the license not be "detrimental to the 
,velfare, health, peace, and morals of the inhabitants of the neighbor-
hood,"165 are intended more to protect the public from abuse of the 
liquor laws than to see if an individual deserves the acclaim of the 
state. Furthermore, licenses are typically not exclusive franchises 
and do not confer monopolistic advantages. Finally, their pervasive-
ness in modern society, a fact that provokes the fear of "emasculating 
the distinction" between public and private conduct, stands in 
marked contrast to the limited number of federal charters. 
State incorporation is also distinguishable. Nonprofit corpora-
tions face only the minimal requirements of being nonprofit166 
and possibly of having a charitable, civic, or other social.purpose.167 
Although all states require that the purposes of the corporation 
not be contrary to law or to public policy,168 scrutiny of a requested 
charter situation, but the duty not to discriminate in providing services is mandated 
by the common law and does not depend on a governmental action theory. Recently, 
however, a governmental action theory has been advanced to impose a due process 
requirement on termination of services. See Note, Light a Candle and Call an Attar• 
ney-The Utility Shutoff Cases, 58 IowA L. REv. 1161 (1973). 
162. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
163. See, e.g., Karst 8c Van Alstyne, Comment: Sit-Ins and State Actions-Mr. 
• Justice Douglas, Concurring, 14 STAN. L. REv. 762 (1962); Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: 
Great Expectations, 1963 SuP. Cr. REv. 101, 116. 
164. Karst 8c Van Alstyne, supra note 163, at 774-75 ("There is no magic to a 
license from the government; it has none of the significance of governmental assis-
tance ••• .''). 
165 PA. STAT. tit. 47, § 4-404 (1951). This was the statute involved in Moose Lodge 
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
166. A nonprofit corporation is typically defined as a "corporation no part of the 
income or profit of which is distributable to its members, directors, or officers.'' 
ABA-ALI MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Ac:r § 2c (rev. 1964). 
167. See, e.g., id. § 4: (rev. 1964): "Corporations may be organized under this Act 
for any lawful purpose or purposes, including, without being limited to, any one or 
more of the following purposes: charitable; benevolent; eleemosynary; educational; 
civic; patriotic; political; religious; social; fraternal; literary; cultural; athletic; scien-
tific; agriculturaP, horticultural; animal husbandry; and professional, commercial, 
industrial or trade association • • • .'' An alternative provision would authorize 
formation of a nonprofit corporation for "any lawful purpose.'' Id. alternative § 4: 
(rev. 1964). . 
168. This is true of both profit and nonprofit corporations. See W. Fl.ETCHER, 
CYCLOPEDL\ OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CoRPOMTIONS § 93 (1963). 
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charter does not vest state officials with the power to grant or deny 
incorporation based on whether the purposes of the group merit an 
official "stamp of approval." In In re Association for Preservation 
of Freedom of Choice, Inc.,169 a New York trial court upheld the 
denial of a charter that stated the corporation's purpose to be: "[t]o 
promote the right to individual freedom of choice and freedom of 
association, constituting the right of the individual to associate with 
only those persons with whom he desires to associate.''170 The court, 
finding that the group's purpose was to promote bigotry and thus 
"should not be sanctioned by receiving the imprimateur of this 
court,"171 was reversed by the New York court of appeals. Without 
disagreeing with the lower court's characterization of the organiza-
tion's activities,. the court of appeals defined public policy narrowly 
and held that 
the public policy of the State is not violated by purposes which are 
not unlawful. 
[Agitation to repeal laws or to change the form of government] is 
not against public policy whether indulged in by an indivi'dual or a 
membership corporation, but of course approval of a corporate char-
ter devoted to such a purpose does not imply approval of the views of l 
. its sponsors. It simply means that their expression is lawful, and 
their sponsors entitled to a vehicle for such expression under a stat-
ute which cannot constitutionally be made available only to those 
who are in harmony with the majority viewpoint. Dissenting organi-
zations have equal rights, so far as freedom of expression is con-
cerned, as any other groups, and are entitled to an equal and objec-
tive application of the statute.172 
In short, state incorporation, like state licensing, does not bestow 
acclaim. State charters are granted freely and governmental scrutiny 
is limited and nondiscretionary. Congress, on the other hand, grants 
few charters, strictly scrutinizes the social objectives of the group 
seeking incorporation, and retains ultimate discretion even after its 
standards are met.173 The conclusion that the grant of a federal 
charter is sufficient governmental involvement to subject a group to 
constitutional restraints is therefore easily kept within boundaries 
that do not "utterly emasculate" the distinction between public and 
private action. 
169. 17 Misc. 2d 1012, 187 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1959), afjd. on rehearing, 18 
Misc. 2d 534, 188 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1959), afjd., IO App. Div. 2d 873, 202 N,Y.S.2d 218 
(1960), revd., 9 N.Y.2d 376, 174 N.E.2d 487, 214 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1962). 
170. 17 Misc. 2d at 1012, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 706-07. 0 
171. 17 Misc. 2d at 1013, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 707. 
172. 9 N.Y.2d at 382-83, 174 N.E.2d at 489-90, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92 (emphasis 
added). See also In re Owles v. Lomenw, 38 App. Div. 2d 981, 329 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1972). 
178. See note 63 supra. 
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In conclusion, it should be remembered that a finding of govern-
mental action does not ~nd the inquiry into the propriety of a 
group's membership policies. A court must further consider whether 
the challenged policies are proscribed by the equal protection guar-
antee of the fifth amendment. Equal protection analysis, however, 
requires detailed consideration of the nature and justification for 
the particular discrimination involved, and must therefore be left 
for determination in individual cases. 
